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The English School’s Approach to International Law 
 
(For C. Navari (ed.), Theorising International Society: English School Methods, New York: 
Palgrave, forthcoming 2009) 
 
Peter Wilson 
 
One of the defining features of the English school is the emphasis it places on normative rules, 
and in particular the rules of international law. Yet the position of the English school on 
international law has nowhere been properly set out. The first purpose of this chapter is to 
provide a fairly detailed account of the English school’s position on international law. I do this 
with reference to those members of the ‘classic’ English school who have been most concerned 
to explore the nature of international law and its place in international society: C. A. W. Manning; 
Hedley Bull; and Alan James. I then look at the criticisms that are typically made of the school’s 
approach and set out the main lines of reply, including those of certain ‘modern’ members, 
namely Terry Nardin and Robert Jackson, who have sought to strengthen the methodological 
foundations of the approach. I then identify some of the limitations of the school’s approach 
which its modern adherents will need to address if its relevance is to be sustained in the twenty-
first century. I conclude with some reflections on method. 
  
 There are few, if any, better introductions to the role of international law in international 
relations than that provided by the English school. The accounts provided by Manning, Bull, 
and James are systematic and precise. They are also highly accessible. They presuppose no 
more than a basic knowledge of international law—its sources, scope, and some of the 
controversies surrounding it. They similarly presuppose only a basic knowledge of modern 
international affairs and international theory. They eschew all unnecessary jargon. Admittedly, 
the idiosyncratic style of Manning is not to everyone’s taste.  But while the mode of expression 
 
 
1
may be unfamiliar, no specialist knowledge is needed to decipher it, only patience and a 
reasonably alert intelligence. 
 
 
 
International Law, Society and Order 
The general stance of the school may be described as follows.  International law is a real body 
of law, no less binding than domestic law, and therefore no less deserving of the name 'law'. 
Although the main bases of international order are to be found elsewhere, international law is 
certainly not without efficacy in this regard. Importantly, international law provides a normative 
framework, an essential ingredient for the successful operation of any large and complex social 
arrangement. By providing a reasonably clear guide as to what is the done thing, and what is 
not, in any given set of circumstances, of what can be expected and what not, and what will be 
tolerated and what will likely be met with a disapproving, perhaps vociferous, response, law 
helps to reduce the degree of unpredictability in international affairs. For members of the 
English school, international law 'stands at the very centre of the international society's 
normative framework'.1 It supports 'a structure of expectations without which the intercourse of 
states would surely suffer an early collapse'.2
 
 While lacking a central legislature to make new and modify existing law, international 
society nonetheless has its own mechanisms for changing the law and keeping it up-to-date. As 
a result, international law is not immune or unsympathetic to the call of justice. The slowness 
with which many changes in the law take place is not so much a defect of international legal 
mechanisms as a reflection of the society in which they operate. 
 
 Unlike the situation pertaining in most domestic legal systems, international law should 
not be conceived as a means of social control, much less as an instrument of social reform 
(although there is a strong tendency to view it in such a manner3). Rather it should be seen as 
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a body of rules, deemed by those to whom it applies as binding, the purpose of which is to 
facilitate regular, continuous, and generally orderly international relationships. 
 
 As a legal system, it is sui generis. To evaluate the significance and efficacy of 
international law in terms of a domestic legal standard makes no more sense than to evaluate 
the merits and utility of one activity—say golf—in terms of another—say long-distance running. 
As competitive sports as well as recreational activities both golf and long-distance running have 
things in common. But success in these activities, as well as being relative to the personal aims 
of the participant, depends on a strongly contrasting set of skills and mental and physical 
disciplines. To judge one in terms of the skills and disciplines needed to perform the other is 
absurd, or certainly not helpful.  Likewise, it is absurd, or certainly not helpful, to judge 
international law in terms of the sources, mechanisms, and objectives of law emanating from a 
very different, domestic, social milieu. 
  
A Sociological Approach 
It may be inferred from this that the approach of the English school to international law is 
sociological. Members of the school have been at pains to point out that law always reflects the 
society from which it emanates. Any given system of law can only be properly comprehended 
and evaluated by examining the social milieu that gives rise to it.  Sense can thus only be made 
of international law by making sense of international society.  Importantly, the significance and 
efficacy of international law can only be ascertained by examining the nature, institutional 
structure, values (if any), and goals (if any) of international society. It was this essentially 
relativistic conviction that led Manning, in particular, to stress that International Relations should 
be not be conceived as part of Political Science, History or Law but as a distinct academic 
discipline: one which drew on these and other cognate disciplines, but which discarded their 
domestic, ‘state-bound’,  legal, ethical and sociological presuppositions.4
 
The Defining Features of International Society 
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First and foremost, the school emphasises the absence of common government in international 
society. For Manning, '[m]unicipal law exists, and is what it is, because, domestically, there 
does exist social control. International law exists and is what it distinctively is because, 
internationally, there does not. Municipal law is the handmaiden of government, international 
law of diplomacy'.5According to James, '...the cardinal characteristic which distinguishes the 
international society from others is the lack of government, the absence of central authority and 
the concomitant dispersal of authority'.6 Internationally there exists no central legislature to 
make new and amend existing legal rules. There is no central agency charged with 
enforcement of the rules. There is no central court or judicial body empowered to adjudicate 
disputes over the rules—or at least not one before which a state can haul another state against 
its will. In terms of H. L. A. Hart's conception of law as a union of primary (prescriptive) rules 
and secondary (institutional empowering) rules, in international society there are no universally 
agreed upon 'rules of recognition', 'rules of change', and 'rules of adjudication'.7
 
 In Bull's view, international law differs from municipal law 'in one central respect: 
whereas law within the modern state is backed up by the authority of government, including its 
power to use or threaten force, international law is without this kind of prop'.8 As a consequence, 
and in sharp contrast to municipal law, the efficacy of international law does to a large extent 
depend on self help, including on occasions the threat and use of force. It is for this reason, Bull 
continues, that there is an intimate connection in international society between the efficacy of 
law and the functioning of the balance of power. 'It is only if power, and the will to use it, are 
distributed in international society in such a way that states can uphold at least certain rights 
when they are infringed, that respect for rules of international law can be maintained'.9
 
 One consequence of the absence of central government is that the utility of international 
law as an instrument of social change is severely limited. In domestic society, law is frequently 
used as a tool of social policy. Changes are made to the law with the explicit intention of 
expediting changes in behaviour. The employment of this tool is often successful due to fear on 
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the part of potential miscreants of punishment. But the main factor is the greater respect for the 
law qua law that domestic society enjoys vis á vis international society.10 So while certain social 
changes necessitate the creation of new rules of international law or the amendment of existing 
ones (for example changes spurred by technological innovation in areas such as sea use, and 
the use of air and outer space), and while other desired changes can be assisted by changes in 
the law (for example in the field of human rights), the law itself is powerless to bring about 
changes in behaviour unless such changes are already desired by all the relevant actors.11
 
 The English school acknowledges, however, that the setting of general standards in law 
can have a long-run effect on behaviour. James puts the point as follows: a set of exact rights 
and duties 'will almost certainly represent a pre-existing intent or willingness on the part of all 
subject to them to act in the way they indicate.'  Their translation into law is therefore not likely 
to have much of an independent effect on behaviour. However, legal obligations that are only 
loosely defined may by virtue of that fact be accepted despite a lack of a strong commitment to 
their observance. Since they do not have to pin themselves down in detail, the signatories may 
reasonably assume that if they need to act in a way contrary to their commitment, they will not 
have too much difficulty in finding a reasonably plausible legal justification. 'However, once a 
principle enjoys the dignity of law states may come to feel, to a greater extent than before, that 
they should try to live up to it.' Moreover, 'the inducement to do so will … be stronger in that the 
principle is now established as a criterion, albeit a rather ambiguous one, in the light of which 
those bound by it can be judged.' Additional critical opportunities will have been created. As a 
result states may cautiously amend their behaviour in line with the obligation 'for they dislike 
being charged with breaches of the law'.12  Giving a social aspiration a footing in law can thus 
help bring about the realisation of that aspiration over time. In this way law can have a modest 
independent impact on international behaviour. In James's view the abolition of the slave trade, 
the outlawing of the use of force as an instrument of national policy, and the delegitimisation of 
colonialism all had their legal roots in the establishment of an initially vague legal principle. 
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 The potential independent impact of law has recently been analysed by Yasuaki Onuma. 
A prominent Japanese international lawyer, he categorises some treaties as ‘aspirational’ in 
that they embody global aspirations shared by the overwhelming majority of members of 
international society. Examples include the 1966 UN human rights conventions and the 1990 
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. In entering such treaties, states communicate 
to their peers in the most solemn way possible their intention to work towards certain common 
goals. These treaties are not necessarily observed from the outset in a strict manner. It is 
widely known, for example, that there is a gap between major human rights treaties and 
reality.13 Yet framing such agreements in law gives them a dignity, legitimacy and authority that 
no member of the international club can openly deny. ‘As such they induce convergence, if not 
strict observance, of the behaviour of diverse members of international society over a period of 
time’.14 The trend for this kind of ‘aspirational’ law-making since 1945 is sufficiently strong for 
Dorothy Jones to talk of a ‘declaratory tradition’ in modern international law, a key feature of 
which is to create a body of rules and intentions more akin to moral philosophy than positive 
law.15
 
 A further consequence of the absence of government is the familiar reflection on the 
security imperative. In domestic society individuals look to government and its agencies to 
provide a large amount of their physical, and in many cases their economic security. States are 
not so lucky. While they may belong to universal or regional associations whose declared job it 
is to ensure the collective security of its members, states know that when it comes to security 
they ultimately have to look after them themselves. This explains why, when a conflict arises 
between 'an urgent national demand and fidelity to the law' it is usually the latter that gives 
way.16 Largely if not exclusively because of the anarchical setting in which they find themselves, 
states are highly self-regarding in their behaviour. They invariably put the satisfaction of 
important national interests before observance of the law on the relatively rare occasions when 
they starkly conflict. It also explains why, although there is a huge amount of important 
international law in the field of security, states have not been greatly assured by those legal 
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instruments whereby the parties bind themselves never to attack or threaten to attack their 
fellows, or commit themselves to immediately come to the assistance of the victim of such an 
attack. It is due to this understanding of states’ self-interpretation of their security predicament 
that members of the English school share E. H. Carr’s dim view of Article 16 of the League of 
Nations Covenant and the Kellogg-Briand Pact.17
 
 The second defining feature concerns the importance of normative rules in society, and 
the role of the most important of those rules—law—in shaping behaviour.  According to the 
English school, normative rules are essential for the efficient and orderly conduct of any 
complex social activity. Such rules provide a social grouping with a 'body of understandings 
about proper behaviour'.18 They provide social actors with a fair amount of confidence as to 
what, normally, will be done and what will not be done, and the mode of its doing. In brief, 
normative rules provide a behavioural framework. As Alan James puts it, these rules are 'the 
sine qua non for the existence of coherent group activity or an effectively-functioning society'.19
 
 Normative rules can be of several kinds: rules of prudence, of etiquette, moral or ethical 
rules.  However, by far the most important kind of normative rules, in international as in 
domestic society, are legal rules.  According to James: 
 
 The fundamental explanation for this is to be found in the different obligatory force of 
legal and non-legal rules. For, in the public sphere, non-legal rules carry a somewhat 
uncertain sense of obligation. Those to whom they apply are expected rather than 
obliged to observe them. A standard has been erected to which it is intended that 
behaviour should conform, but society and its members customarily feel that they have 
no ground for trying to insist upon it. Observance is the done rather than the demanded 
thing. Law, on the other hand, is inseparably associated with the idea of strict 
obligation.20
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Part of its obligatory nature is that the law generally aims for precision. Its object is to leave 
those bound by it in little doubt as to what it expects of them. There are exceptions, but 
'generally the main function of law is to create an exact as well as a binding relationship'.21
  
 Of course, the extent to which this function is achieved varies from law to law and from 
system to system. There is precise law and vague law, with not all vague law is bad law. In 
Manning's view certainty as to what the law requires is the exception rather than the rule, even 
in the most orderly and legally fastidious societies: 
 
 What litigants get even from the highest court in the land, is at best a decision which is 
constitutionally and legally incumbent upon them to accept as presumably correct. It is 
formally binding upon them. But lawyers, even so, are at liberty to probe in published 
articles the reasoning upon which the decision rested. So, when it is said, in belittlement 
of international law, that all too often, when appealed to, its trumpet gives forth an 
uncertain sound, the fitting comment is that this is inevitable and only to be expected, 
since international law is like any other kind of law.22
 
  No sooner have they established the importance of international law, however, than 
they set about dispelling the sanguine belief that it has an independent causal effect on 
behaviour. In their view, international law does not so much determine state behaviour as 
provide a framework within which and with reference to which states make their decisions.  'The 
typical question asked by a state is not, what does the law require me to do? but, does the law 
permit me to do this? or, how can I lawfully achieve this goal? Likewise it will ask whether it has 
any ground for complaint in particular circumstances, or whether another state's complaint is 
well grounded'.23  In Manning's view, it is in the main only indirectly that the decisions of states 
are influenced by legal considerations, the main factor at work here being 'the importance 
attached by others to the law's correct observance' (on which more below). 24
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 Bull similarly contends that while the rules of international law are widely observed, it 
would be wrong to conclude that the principal explanation for this is respect for the law itself.  
'International law', he says, 'is a social reality to the extent that there is a very substantial 
degree of conformity to its rules; but it does not follow from this that international law is a 
powerful agent or motive force in world politics'.25 States sometimes obey international law 
through habit or inertia: 'they are, as it were, programmed to operate within the framework of 
established principles'.26 In more rational mode, they sometimes view actions sanctioned by 
international law as being 'valuable, mandatory or obligatory' regardless of any legal 
undertakings they may have acquired (what Bull calls the 'international law of community'). 
Observance may result from coercion or a threat of coercion from a superior force (the 
'international law of power'). Observance may also result from the interest a state perceives in 
reciprocal action: many agreements are upheld by a strong sense of mutual interest (the 
'international law of reciprocity'). The argument that states obey international law only when it 
coincides with their interests, or that they do so only for ulterior motives, does not however 
dispose of the question of the law’s legal force. 'The importance of international law', Bull 
concludes, 'does not rest on the willingness of states to abide by its principles to the detriment 
of their interests, but in the fact that they so often judge it in their interests to conform to it'.27 
While it would be incorrect to assume that international behaviour is determined by the law, it is 
a salient fact that states often consider observance of the law to be in their interest. 
Furthermore, they are almost invariably concerned to act in a manner not inconsistent with the 
law, or at least to act in a manner not inconsistent with a plausible reading of it. They are 
reluctant to acquire a reputation as law-breakers. 
 
 This latter point is central to Manning's interpretation of why international law meets with 
such widespread compliance. On the one hand, by providing a set of agreed symbols for the 
conduct of international relations, law in a sense simplifies international life. 'It is here,' he 
suggests, 'in the partial prefabricating of the hundred and one decisions that make up the daily 
round for the normal middle-of-the-road sovereign member of international society, that 
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international law performs its most characteristic service’. 28  On the other hand, much of 
international life proceeds on the generally well-founded assumption that 'what is bindingly 
provided for will duly be performed ....And this despite the absence of a court around the corner 
before which a state defaulting on a promise may be hauled'.29  States comply with many of 
their legal obligations because it is convenient or beneficial for them to do so. But they also 
frequently comply with the law even when the benefit derived from so doing is uncertain. The 
reason for this, Manning argues, is peer-pressure, real or perceived. According to Manning, 'like 
the individual, the state conducts itself in the presence of a cloud of witnesses, comprising a 
diversity of what to the social psychologist are known as reference groups. And, as often as not, 
if it be wondered why a state has done this or that, and no more obvious explanation avails, the 
answer is that, in doing this or that, it was meeting the expectations of some politically or 
diplomatically consequential reference group'.30 For Manning, regard for legal obligations is to a 
large extent a function of the expectations of the relevant reference group.  The judgement of 
the relevant reference group was, in Manning's opinion, a potent sanction for the efficacy of any 
given legal rule. (It is worth noting, however, that in the 1960s and 1970s Manning believed that 
the reactions to breaches of the law of the relevant reference group were losing their fierceness 
and authenticity, and consequently their terrors. And, 'the less your indignation, the less my 
self-restraint'.31) 
 
 A third defining feature of the English school's sociology of international law is the 
emphasis it gives to the lack of solidarity in international society. For members of the English 
school, unlike realists, lack of solidarity is more a cause of anarchy than an effect. The legal 
implications of this lack of solidarity are profound. It has largely undermined attempts to outlaw 
war and transform international society into a Kelsenian ‘coercive order’ in which acts of war are 
conceived as either breaches of law or measures of law enforcement. 32  In Bull’s view, 
agreement on this conception is unlikely to be forthcoming. ‘The typical case is that in which 
states are not agreed as to which side in a conflict, if either, possesses a just cause. There may 
be deep disagreement among states as to which side represents the community and which the 
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law breakers, or there may be general concurrence in treating war as purely political in 
nature’.33 Part of Bull’s fondness for the positive international lawyers of the nineteenth century 
derived from their firm appreciation of the lack of solidarity in international life and their 
consequent view that the law did not distinguish between just and unjust causes of war.34
 
 A second consequence of the lack of international solidarity is that changes in the law 
can only be made on the basis of consent. States do not trust their fellow members of 
international society to make law for them since they cannot guarantee they will be of the same 
mind, of the same ideological and political disposition. In practice this has two important 
consequences. On the one hand, it means that international law is not easily altered. There are 
well established procedures in domestic society for altering the law even if such alterations are 
favoured by some but by no means all. In international society such procedures, to the extent 
that they exist, are invariably clumsy and inefficient. This makes international law more 
protective than municipal law of the ‘vested interest of the few’.35 On the other hand, it means 
that in frustration, or as a means of ideological warfare, states sometimes seek to press a 
majority view (or what they assume to be a majority view) on the rest of international society. 
They thus seek to replace consent with consensus, and assume the mantle of speaking for the 
conscience of mankind. This approach led Manning to conclude that the principal site of this 
kind of activity, the United Nations, had become (in contrast to the far more honourable and 
honest League) little more than an arena for the conduct of political warfare.36 In Bull’s view, the 
tendency on the part of certain states to assume a consensus, and to act as if they represented 
that consensus when no consensus actually existed, was a major threat to international order. 
‘The result … is not that the rules deriving from the assumption of consensus are upheld, but 
simply that the traditional rules which assume a lack of consensus are undermined’.37
 
Criticisms 
Four types of criticism are typically levelled at the classic English school’s reading of the 
relationship between international law and international society. The first is that the school 
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simply restates the core propositions of nineteenth and early twentieth century legal positivism.  
The notion that society and law are inextricably intertwined, that the character of a legal system 
is always a reflection of the character of the society that gives rise to it, and that the anarchical 
character of international society accounts for the paramount importance of consent and self-
help in international law—none of this is very original. The second criticism is that the school 
conceives international law in a limited and in certain respects unrealistic way.  In confining its 
understanding of law to ‘a body of rules which binds states and other agents in world politics ... 
and is considered to have the status of law’,38 it fails to recognise the indeterminacy of much 
law and the extent to which cultural, political, ethical and other factors intervene in international 
legal processes. The third criticism is that the school’s approach is inherently conservative, 
perhaps even morally complacent. The sociology it posits for understanding international law is 
one that rests on certain static features of international life such as absence of central 
government and lack of cultural, social and political solidarity. It consequently endorses laws 
that are limited in ambition, laws that aim to keep things more or less as they are (because that 
is the limit of what the society it reflects can tolerate). But a sociology which emphasised 
change—globalisation, cultural homogenisation, growing demand for the realisation universal 
human rights—would supply very different criteria for judging legal vitality. The moral 
complacency resides in the reluctance on the part of members of the school to step outside the 
world of states and make ethical judgments based on more ‘critical’ and independent values. 
The lack of willingness to criticise the law, according to this view, reflects general satisfaction 
with the law, which in turn reflects satisfaction with the values of the chief architects of the law: 
the great powers.39 The fourth criticism is that the school’s propositions are very general in 
nature, and little effort is made to empirically verify them. While members of the English school 
have consistently stressed the centrality of international law to international society they have 
done little to establish causality; i.e. identify precisely the mechanisms by which and the extent 
to which law produces certain behaviours.  
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 There is no doubt that nineteenth and early twentieth century legal positivism had a 
profound influence on the thinking of English School legal commentators, as recent scholarship 
has affirmed.40 One of Manning’s first published articles was a reappraisal of John Austin’s 
jurisprudence.41 Bull was influenced by Oppenheim and conceived much of his work in IR in 
terms of retrieving the lessons and wisdom of nineteenth century political and legal thought, 
which was based on a firm appreciation of the limits of cooperation, particularly collective 
decision-making and collective action, in a culturally plural world.42 James was influenced by 
Manning, and while his ‘Sociology of International Law’ course, taught at the LSE in the 1960s 
and 1970s contains few references to the big names of positivist international law of the 
nineteenth century, it is full of references to those lawyers who assumed their mantle in the 
early-mid twentieth century—Brierly, Schwarzenberger, Fitzmaurice, Jennings, Stone.  
 
  Of equal importance, however, is the intellectual context in which Manning, Bull and 
James wrote. Manning was reacting against those writers of the League period—his LSE 
professorial predecessor, Philip Noel-Baker, chief among them—who believed that peace could 
be achieved by outlawing certain types of war and replicating internationally those institutions 
and practices successful in producing civil order domestically.43 Bull was reacting partly against 
these ideas (his first book Control of the Arms Race was a direct response to Noel-Baker’s The 
Arms Race on which he worked for a period as Noel-Baker’s research assistant), and partly 
against their latest manifestation in the ‘policy science’ approach of Myers S. McDougal and the 
New Haven School and the World Order Models Project of Richard Falk and Saul Mendlovitz. 
Against these moves Manning, Bull and James did not see themselves as offering something 
new, but rather as re-stating to a new audience, the nature of international society, the limits of 
its corrigibility, and the values it helped to preserve. 
 
 The second criticism comes in more or less radical forms, from the revisionist stance of 
Rosalyn Higgins to the instrumentalism of the New Haven school and the radical rejectionism of 
Martti Koskenniemi and Critical Legal Studies.44 According to Higgins, international law is best 
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conceived not as a body of rules but as a ‘continuing process of authoritative decisions’.45 Law 
involves far more than the impartial application of pre-existing rules. ‘International law is the 
entire decision-making process ... not just the reference to the trend of past decisions’.46 Those 
charged with making decisions on the basis of international law do not simply find the relevant 
rule and then apply it. Rather they make choices, not between fully justified and groundless 
legal claims, but between claims  possessing varying degrees of legal merit. The process will 
always involve considerations—cultural, humanitarian, and political—other than the purely legal. 
Higgins concludes that policy considerations are an integral part of the international legal 
process.47 Whether they are aware of the fact or not ‘authoritative decision makers’ habitually 
rely on policy preferences and assumptions in arriving at decisions on the law. No amount of 
legal training will enable them to keep law ‘neutral’. Law and politics are inextricably linked. 
Higgins makes the further claim that international law is a normative system ‘harnessed to the 
achievement of common values’.48 This opens the door to a fully New Haven school conception 
of law as an instrumental tool for the realisation of these common values. 
 
 Bull’s response to this view was typically robust and commonsensical. He conceded 
that the process of legal decision-making, nationally as well as internationally, involved 
extraneous factors such as the social, moral and political outlook of judges. Decision-making 
could never be a pure process of the non-contentious identification and application of existing 
legal rules. But without reference to a body of rules, the idea of law, Bull claimed, was 
unintelligible. The notion of legal decision-making as a distinct social process, distinguishable 
from other social processes, could only be sustained by reference to a pre-existing and agreed 
body of legal rules. The conception of international law as a body of binding rules was, 
therefore, paramount. The existence of extraneous factors in legal decision-making did not do 
away with the concept of legal reasoning. The implication of merging the legal, political and 
other social domains on the ground of providing a more realistic account of how law is actually 
made was that lawyers would cease to have anything distinctive to offer. The idea that 
international law was not a body of rules but a process of authoritative decision undermined 
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International Law as a branch of study separate from Sociology, International Relations, and 
Political Science. Ultimately, the logic of conceiving law in this way, and of determining its 
content with reference to its stated or postulated social purpose, was the reduction of choice 
between rival legal claims ‘to the choice between one authority’s moral and legal values and 
those of another’.49 The English school is concerned with identifying actually existing norms of 
state behaviour. Laws, particularly hard (precise, widely accepted and observed) laws, signal 
the most substantial norms. Too much attention to legal process can lead to a confused 
situation in which the actual identity of the norm is lost. Bundling everything pertaining to or 
impinging on international law into a basket called ‘international law’ merely serves to 
compound the problem. 
  
 The assertion that the school’s approach is conservative and perhaps even complacent, 
our third criticism, has been effectively dealt with in landmark works of the modern English 
school by Nardin and Jackson. In subtly different ways both theorists draw on the insights of 
Michael Oakeshott on the character of different types of human association, to provide a robust, 
political theoretical, defence of the value of international society as a particular kind of human 
association. For Nardin it is a practical association. This is conceived as a relationship between 
individuals or groups who pursue different and possibly incompatible purposes. The basis of 
their association is commonly accepted restrictions on how they each may pursue their 
separate purposes. In terms of this conception, international law is understood as a body of 
common rules, by and large rooted in the customary practices of states, which enables states 
to coexist while pursuing diverse purposes. Practical associations embrace a conception of law 
and morality which is process- or constraint-orientated: their purpose is to foster mutual 
constraint, mutual accommodation and the toleration of diversity. Purposive associations, by 
way of contrast, consist of relationships between individuals or groups who cooperate for the 
purpose of securing certain shared beliefs, values or interests. The basis of this association is 
the existence of shared goals and the adoption of cooperative practices for their achievement. 
In terms of this conception, international law is a body of rules understood instrumentally. Their 
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value is judged according to the relative efficacy with which they foster the desired ends. 
Purposive conceptions thus embrace a conception of law that is end-orientated.50
 
 For Jackson international society is a societas.  It consists of ‘human relations 
characterized by the coexistence of independent selves who conduct themselves by freely 
observing common standards of conduct’ (‘morality as the art of mutual accommodation’ in 
Oakeshott’s terms). International law according to this notion consists primarily of a body of 
practices: usages and customs devised over time by statespeople in order to define and 
facilitate their relationships and avoid unnecessary collision.  By way of contrast a univeritas 
consists of ‘human relations characterized by collective enterprise between mutually dependent 
partners, or collaborators, in the pursuit of a conjoint purpose’ (the ‘morality of the common 
good’ in Oakeshott’s terms).  International law according to this conception consists primarily of 
a series of declared goals and ideals towards which statespeople strive in their foreign policies, 
and a series of measures to facilitate their achievement. Rather than embedded practices 
regulating current conduct it consists of declarations of intent regarding conduct in the future.51
 
 One of the reasons for making these distinctions between different types of human 
association, and setting out their characteristics so carefully (and in the case of Nardin in fine 
detail), is to demonstrate that one type of association (purposive or universitas) is not in 
principle superior to the other (practical or societas)—though the prejudice of the modern state 
has wrought this assumption. Much depends on the character of the associates in question, 
and the commonality or divergence in values, goals and interests. In true conservative fashion 
(and very much in the spirit of Oakeshott) Nardin and Jackson demonstrate with subtlety and 
precision that given the diverse character of states, a practical association or societas is a 
superior form of human arrangement than a purposive association or universitas. Furthermore, 
there are great dangers in attempting to force international society into a purposive mould. With 
regard to international law this is summed up in Jackson’s critique of the declaratory tradition. 
He notes that many politicians sign broad declarations of the UN and other international 
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organisations ‘in full awareness that they are not obliged to achieve or even pursue the ideals 
they affirm’. Such affirmations are easy to make and their value as standards of conduct are 
low. Many of these declarations and resolutions cannot be realised or enforced. This has the 
corrosive effect of discrediting the UN and other organisations when the undertakings given are 
not fulfilled or even seriously pursued. In this way such declarations provoke cynicism on the 
part of many who expect international actors to live up to their ideals. ‘Is there any more 
efficient way of morally discrediting oneself,’ Jackson concludes, ‘than by declaring an intention 
to do something that is deemed to be urgently required …and then failing to do it?’ Making 
declarations and proclaiming praiseworthy goals is an undemanding activity. Unless matched 
by binding obligations the result is merely the cheapening and politicisation of ideals. ‘Rather 
than reinforcing and deepening the traditional moral basis of society …the declaratory approach 
may have the opposite effect of undermining it by stretching it and diluting it’.52
 
 The contribution of Nardin and Jackson, at root, is to have constructed a more robust 
moral defence of international society than that hitherto provided by the English school. Bull’s 
defence was that international society provided (or was capable of providing) a greater degree 
of order for its members (and indeed humankind as a whole) than its alternatives, and that 
these alternatives were in any event of doubtful viability. Nardin and Jackson persuasively add 
the liberty of states to pursue their diverse purposes to the moral good facilitated by 
international society. They further establish that there may be reasons to prefer a practically 
based association of states even when the achievement of a more purposive alternative is 
practicable. They thereby scotch the claim that the English school is guilty of moral 
complacency. 
 
 The fourth criticism concerning the generality of the English school’s propositions, the 
failure to empirically verify them, and the failure to identify relationships of cause and effect 
amounts to a serious misunderstanding of the nature of its approach. The generality of its 
propositions is a reflection of the fact that, certainly in its classical mode, the English school has 
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been concerned not with this or that state, or this or that group of states, but with the society of 
states as a whole. It has sought, to borrow a phrase from Manning, to take a bird’s-eye view, 
and arrive at a general understanding of the role law internationally. Such an understanding is 
not one that can be empirically proven or disproven. Empirical evidence is always important, 
but all important is the way it is marshalled. There is no way, they contend, of marshalling 
evidence neutrally. All evidence is to a greater or lesser extent theory-driven. The important 
point is to be self-aware and self-critical of one’s theories, as well as one’s evidence. In the light 
of this, members of the English school have been encouraged by the fact that their 
understanding of the role of law internationally seems to account for certain key facts better 
than rival understandings: while state behaviour is never determined by law alone, states 
nonetheless take law very seriously; while they never act contrary to their perceived interest, 
they frequently deem law, or legal propriety, to be a factor in the calculation of interest; and 
while they sometimes breach the law, they rarely do so brazenly—they always attempt to offer 
a legally plausible defence of their actions. Nicholas Wheeler’s recent study of the Kosovo 
bombing campaign is a good example of English school analysis in which interests, ideas of 
propriety, and law are seen as constantly circling one another.53  
 
New Directions? 
The sociology of international law of the English school is fine as far as it goes. States are still 
the most important category of actor in international relations. States are still by far the most 
important subjects of international law. The lack of solidarity on so many questions of 
international import—concerning inter alia environmental protection, controlling the spread of 
weapons of mass destruction, the promotion of democracy, the limits of legitimate non-state 
violence, humanitarian intervention, compensation for past colonial wrongs, the obligations of 
rich nations towards the poor—makes the creation of new law a slow, cumbersome, and often 
fractious process. There is still little agreement on the need for and feasibility of central 
enforcement mechanisms. International law, for good or for ill, remains a convenient 
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behavioural framework rather than an instrument for social control, or vehicle for the promotion 
of the world common good. 
 
 But the approach of the school does have a number of limitations. Three of them are 
salient. 
 
1. Role of Power  
One of the strengths of the English school is that it does not shy away from recognising the 
indispensable connection between power and law. As Carr reminded his predominantly 
utopian readership nearly seventy years ago, that the relationship between power and law is 
real and strong in all legal systems, even the most advanced and democratic.54 But it is 
particularly strong in the international system. This relationship gave rise to despair, 
contempt, or cynicism on the part of many observers. But Carr and various English school 
thinkers that followed him, Butterfield and Bull most notably, were able to show that such 
reactions were inappropriate. The relationship between law and power at the international 
level was generally a healthy one in that it facilitated the performance of certain important 
functions. One of these was the maintenance of a balance of power. For Bull, Butterfield and 
others the balance of power was the master institution of international society. Its effective 
operation was indispensable to the achievement of a stable international order. By building 
trust, facilitating diplomatic communication, stabilising expectations, and solidifying without 
mummifying alliances, law had the important role of facilitating the balance of power; thus 
making possible an international system in which one voice, one moral viewpoint, one 
political system did not predominate. Law and the balance of power functioned to preserve 
the individual liberty of states and prevent the imposition of social, cultural and political 
uniformity that would result from any one state acquiring global dominance. 
 
 If law helps to facilitate the balance of power, its content at any one time necessarily 
reflects the area and extent of consensus achieved by the major powers. A legal system that 
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attempts to go significantly beyond this area of consensus, such as that created by the 
League in 1920, is not only doomed to failure but threatens to bring the whole legal and 
moral order into disrepute. The chief defence of the intimate link between law and power 
internationally is that it takes the moral and emotional heat out of international disputes and 
rivalries, prevents campaigns of moral righteousness, and suppresses the latent domination 
of any one moral and political viewpoint. Far from being an anarchic principle, generating 
instability and mistrust, as many felt following the disaster of 1914, the balance of power 
encourages states to take a long-term view of their interests, to moderate their behaviour, 
and limit their ambitions. The law’s job is to buttress these constraining forces without 
restricting the diplomatic and strategic flexibility required for effective balancing. 
 
 This is merely a sketch of what in English school writing is a complex, and often 
implicit, understanding of the relationship between power and law in international society.55 I 
have provided it to show that the English school has an answer to Marxists and Critical 
Theorists who view international law as an expression of the will of the international ruling 
class, an ideological device for legitimising inequality and Western economic and military 
dominance. It also has an answer to radical liberal critics who view international law as too 
conservative and lacking in ambition, allied too closely to current reality. That answer is that 
legal rules have an important function to perform in preserving the balance of power, and it is 
reckless and erroneous thinking of the first order to propose legal reforms which would 
effectively unhinge law from the balance of power. The effects of such a move would be 
disorder and threats to the liberty of states, big or small, on a global scale. 
 
 This being said, the English school’s stance on power and international law is not 
without its shortcomings, and in addressing them modern English school theorists are 
beginning to take the approach in some new and interesting directions. 
 
Challenge of Unipolarity 
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Firstly, while not the only factors accounting for the wide observance of international law, 
members of the English school stress the importance of enforcement, or fear of enforcement, 
according to the principle of self-help, and social pressure in the form of the expectations of 
‘relevant reference groups’. The implications of this position, however, have not been fully 
explored. The decentralised nature of the international legal system provides states with a good 
deal of discretion on whether and how to respond to suspected breaches of the law. Decision-
makers inevitably take into consideration a variety of factors. Legal considerations no doubt 
feature. But political and economic factors are invariably paramount. The implication of this is 
that those states with the most political clout and the greatest economic resources at their 
disposal will be in the best position to effectively respond to suspected breaches, and to deter 
or fend off the negative responses of others to suspected breaches of their own. This puts a 
solitary superpower such as the US in a uniquely strong and privileged position. Not only are its 
own legally dubious acts unlikely to be met with an effective negative response, but it enjoys an 
unusual amount of discretion on the laws it chooses to uphold and thus further sanctify, and 
those it chooses to overlook and thus, very possibly, weaken. The long-term implications of this 
for the shape of the international legal order are profound. To remain effective any legal system 
has to be seen by the vast  majority of those it applies to as impartial. If large segments of the 
law are seen as providing special protection for particular groups at the expense of the 
community, the law itself, and its normative validity, is thrown into disrepute.  The unipolar 
position of the US presents a special challenge to the benign conception of the links between 
power and law promulgated by the English school. The challenge is complicated not only by the 
absence of effective balancers, but the sceptical even contemptuous attitude towards 
international law exhibited by influential sections of American society. 
 
Challenge of Judicial Independence 
Secondly, the English school has had little to say on the role of power in international courts 
and tribunals. One reason for this is that the heyday of the English school in the 1960s and 
1970s coincided with the height of the Cold War and the emergence of other fissures in the 
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international body politic. At this time there was little opportunity for international juridical 
innovation, and little of it took place. Since the end of the Cold War, however, the opportunity 
and the will to give law more ‘teeth’ by creating new courts and tribunals has arisen, and while 
the pace of innovation—as a good English scholar might predict—has been slow, considerable 
successes have been chalked up e.g. the dispute settlement procedure of the WTO, the Hague, 
Arusha, and Sierra Leone war crimes tribunals, and the International Criminal Court (ICC). But 
there is a sense in which such courts and tribunals are beholden to states not only for their 
success, but the continued existence. States are the paymasters, rich and powerful ones in 
particular. Yet it is states, or in the case of the ICC and the war crimes tribunals, the leaders or 
high ranking officials of states, that these courts and tribunals are mandated to put in the dock. 
The dilemma is clear enough. If they are too tough, or perhaps too consistent, judges and 
prosecutors risk undermining support (political, moral, and financial) for the very processes they 
are trying to implement and strengthen. There is therefore a systemic incentive for courts and 
judges to tread more delicately in the international legal field than they usually do in the 
domestic—for fear of antagonising their paymasters. 
 
 On the other hand it may be true, as one leading practitioner and legal authority has 
recently argued, that a judicial change in climate may be taking place.56 States seem to be 
more prepared to impose strong structures upon themselves, and not run away, in the form of 
withdrawal of support, when the going gets tough. This possibility notwithstanding, it cannot be 
denied that courts and tribunals are a part of and are sometimes influenced by wider power-
political processes. Although they have ignored it in the past, the nature of this relationship will 
require greater scrutiny in the future from those working within the English school tradition.57
 
2. Norm Change 
There is a large and growing literature on the nature of norms and the dynamics of norm 
change in international relations. Given the sociological nature of its approach it is surprising 
that members of the classic English school gave scant attention to this issue. The role of 
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NGOs, pressure groups, political parties, cross-national political groupings, and epistemic 
communities in changing or modifying the values of states was nowhere seriously explored. 
Certain contemporary English school members, notably Andrew Hurrell, have begun to make 
amends for this neglect.  
 
 While noting the importance of such non-state actors in norm development, Hurrell has 
highlighted the fact that most of the traffic in normative ideas is one way: from the West to the 
rest. Most NGOs are Western in origin and they pursue a predominantly Western liberal or 
humanitarian agenda.58 One consequence of this may be the further narrowing of societal and 
cultural diversity and a reshaping of the world in the image of the West. Many will view this as 
largely for the benefit of the West. The point here is that there may be dangers in the headlong 
rush to a more solidarist world legal order the desirability of which global civil society theorists 
and activists assume almost without question. True, the pluralist conception of international law 
can no longer do service unassisted. With the domestic sources of international upheaval and 
conflict so widely understood and recognised, it would be palpably retrograde to seek confine 
the chief norms of international society to the relations between states, and bar them from 
having any purchase on what goes on within them. But the central purpose of the pluralist 
conception, the maintenance of peaceful coexistence between highly diverse political actors, is 
one that retains great relevance. A rush to solidarism that ignores the slow pace of the growth 
of a sense of international community may serve to undermine the very principles it seeks to 
uphold. A large gap could open up between theory and reality, between obligation and practice. 
The resulting cynicism and accusations of hypocrisy could have a withering effect on genuine 
attempts to uphold common international standards, as has been the sad experience in such 
bodies as UNESCO and the UN Commission on Human Rights.59
 
 Connected with this issue of norm change, members of the classic English school were 
perhaps too willing to dismiss liberal interpretations by the UN Security Council of its obligation 
to promote international peace and security as a wilful interpretation of the Charter, for narrow 
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political purposes, and a corruption of the international legal process. Their sociology now 
seems based on too rigid a separation between domestic and international factors. Declaring 
apartheid in South Africa or white supremacy in Rhodesia as a threat to international peace and 
security does not appear today to be stretching the law as far as it did then. Again, the wide 
recognition of the domestic sources of upheaval and conflict instability is an important factor. In 
certain extreme cases of human rights abuses and systematic persecution of minority groups 
(e.g. in Iraq, Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo) members of the Security Council have been able to go 
beyond the usual foot-shuffling and tepid condemnation. Moral concern has been inseparable 
from fears of the likely consequences for international stability of the continuation of such 
untrammelled brutality. In the light of this agreement and recognition of the interconnections 
between domestic brutality and international security, the cautious expansion by the Security 
Council of its remit is arguably not as damaging to the fabric of international order as Bull and 
Manning considered it to be in the 1970s.60
 
3. Domestic and Transnational Reference Groups 
A realist might conclude that a superpower enjoying the unrivalled military and economic 
strength of the US is in a position to flout international law with impunity. It can use its strength 
and influence to minimise the impact of any measures other members of international society 
might deploy in response. The mere existence of its vastly superior strength and influence is 
sufficient to ensure that the response of many will be muted. It is interesting to observe, 
however, that even superpowers, when doing something controversial, invariably offer a legal 
defence, as well as a political or moral defence, of their actions. Even when they emphasise, as 
they sometimes do, the high moral causes for which they act, they never claim that such high 
causes justify their violation of the law.61 Even in extreme cases where an act is manifestly in 
conflict with the law, states big and small still offer some sort of legal justification.62 As members 
of the English school point out this alone demonstrates the importance states attach to the 
observance of law. It is an established social fact that states big and small do not like to gain a 
reputation as law-breakers 
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  Yet there is another set of reasons, unexamined by the English school, why even 
exceptional states, such as the US, cannot violate international law with impunity. In liberal 
democratic states especially, opposition parties, NGOs, and the media take a keen interest in 
legally dubious acts of their governments. While a powerful country such as the US may have 
the luxury of ignoring the negative responses and countermeasures of other states, its liberal 
government cannot afford to ignore the likely responses of interested and potentially 
troublesome domestic actors. These likely responses constitute a big factor in the deliberations 
of policy-makers. To overlook them would amount to a massive and foolish political gamble. In 
addition, many liberal democratic countries have judicial review systems which enable the 
legality and constitutionality of the policies and acts of government to be scrutinised and tested 
in the courts.63 This is especially the case in countries where treaties, once ratified, become 
part of domestic law.  
 
 It is of course true that some major Powers (e.g. China) operate with extremely limited 
domestic restraints due to lack of effective opposition parties, an independent media, active and 
critical NGOs, and an independent judiciary. For these states it is the likely international 
reaction, not domestic, they will be most worried about when contemplating an act of doubtful 
legality. Most liberal democratic states will be worried by both the national and international 
reaction to any such act. It is a significant fact, however, that a Power such as the US is more 
likely to be worried and constrained by the likely reaction of certain important domestic actors 
than that of other states. 
 
 The cloud of witnesses in the presence of which states conduct themselves now 
embraces domestic as well as international actors. Many of these actors, from Amnesty and 
Oxfam to Greenpeace and Jubilee 2000 are now importantly transnational in their organisation 
and scope. This is perhaps the most striking shortcoming of the classic English school’s 
sociology of international law: the failure to take into account the role of domestic and 
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transnational actors. The ‘consequential reference groups’ whose expectations and responses 
states have to take firm note, are no longer—if they ever were—comprised exclusively of states. 
Compliance with the law can only be fully understood by examining the network of domestic, 
transnational and international restraints that prevail in any given case.  
 
Conclusion: Method or Anti-method? 
In this chapter I have refrained from using the word ‘method’. The reason is that the English 
school does not have one. Indeed its whole approach is anti-pathetical to method. A method 
suggests the identification and execution of a series of precise steps in order to achieve a 
specific goal. It makes sense to talk of the method one might employ to learn a musical 
instrument or a foreign language, of the method employed by economists to calculate the GDP 
of a country or its rate of inflation. Method senso stricto suggests technique, the mastery of 
certain technical mental and/or physical moves in order to achieve a practical outcome. In this 
sense the English school eschews method. ‘Approach’ is a much more appropriate term, for it 
suggests a general outlook, the employment of a certain set of concepts, the advancing of a 
certain set of propositions, and the assumption of a certain style or character of argumentation. 
The goal is not the acquisition of a skill, or technique, or practical capability. Rather the goal is 
general understanding or a general appreciation of ‘the relation of things’. I remain wedded to 
the Manningite notion of connoisseurship: that is, refined judgment born of familiarity with and 
feel for a subject. This, rather than objectivity, or science, is what we should strive for in the 
pursuit of social understanding.64 I have found myself using the term ‘approach’ throughout this 
chapter because this word captures the nature of the English school’s engagement with the 
phenomenon of international law. What they attempt to arrive at is not technical knowledge, but 
an appreciation of the nature and character of international law, what we can reasonably expect 
of it, and how it relates to the wider scheme of international relationships. 
 
 This being said, if we conceive the notion of ‘method’ loosely as, say, ways and means 
of proceeding in the making of knowledge-claims, several explanatory strategies can be found 
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at work in English school analysis. In his assertion that international law ‘supports a structure of 
expectations without which the intercourse of states would surely suffer an early collapse’, Alan 
James, for example, puts forward a functional explanation. In his assertion that ‘[t]he 
importance of international law does not rest on the willingness of states to abide by its 
principles to the detriment of their interests, but in the fact that they so often judge it in their 
interests to conform to it’, Hedley Bull puts forward a rational explanation. Manning, by way of 
contrast, sees observance of law in terms of social dynamics: regard for legal obligations is to a 
large extent a function of the expectations of the relevant reference group.  
 
 This ties-in with the observation that one of the distinctive features of the school is its 
methodological pluralism. 65  At least two methods may be identified in the English School 
approach to international law. One is legal positivism, as identified above. This is concerned to 
identify what the law is. The second is aspirational legalism: the identification of soft law and 
broad declarations on a variety of moral themes in order to get a handle on where the law is 
heading. The methodological pluralism of the school is one of its chief assets. Being 
unencumbered by the need to identify a distinct method, being immune to the pressure—very 
considerable in some quarters—to adopt a method senso stricto, and being generally 
unselfconscious about methodological issues, has enabled the school to provide a rich account 
of the relationship between international law and international society.  It is an account that is 
coherent and accessible, but not at the cost of loss of complexity. 
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